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I. PROLOGUE
In an era when women have achieved formal legal equality in the
labor market and in the family, patriarchal power endures. 2 In this Article
I take on what remains one of the “final frontiers of the multi-century legal
project” 3 of securing women’s economic emancipation: economic abuse.4
Economic abuse is a form of intimate partner violence that has recently
begun to generate attention, 5 yet still takes a back seat in our collective
consciousness. 6
Importantly, economic abuse as a socio-legal phenomenon currently
lacks a specific theory and history with which to deeply understand it. A
failure to recognize the profound roots enabling economic abuse
contributes to its perpetuation, trivialization, and marginalization in legal
thought. Such a failure has broad implications for gender equality. This
Article offers a history and a theory through which to understand the
phenomenon’s deep roots, as well as a way to think critically about power
and equality in family-life in this new, seemingly more egalitarian era.7
2. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power, and the Recreation of
Hierarchy, in 69 STUD. IN L., POL., AND SOC’Y 189, 208 (Austin Sarat ed., 2016).
3. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100
CAL. L. REV. 951, 955 (2012).
4. When one thinks of intimate partner violence, one tends to imagine physical violence, such
as battering, and sexual violence, such as marital rape. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, ET AL.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-6, 162, 202-04 (3rd ed. 2013) (noting
that while domestic violence is often thought of as primarily physical, other forms of abuse that are
intended to affect the victims may be involved, but that the legal system often focuses on battering).
5. Littwin, supra note 3; see Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies,
and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson,
Redefining Harm].
6. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 38−42 (2013).
7. On the need for a theory of power in family-life in this era of formal legal equality, see
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 192. Of course, family today takes many forms. However, this
Article pertains to a heterosexual family and its gendered features, which are not shared by all
heterosexual families. For the importance of class and race in understanding how inequality is being
reproduced in families, see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 2-7, 77-80 (2014). Similarly, the Article in no way
seeks to render all women as essentially experiencing the same oppressions, discriminations, liberties,
and resources, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991), albeit studies of economic abuse
concerned mostly lower-income women, Littwin, supra note 3, at 962, important studies on the
intersection of class, race, and disabilities with regards to economic abuse are necessary for future
examination. Currently, my purpose is to ignite a conversation on some of the shared structural
features enabling this phenomenon. Similarly, the Article acknowledges the different masculinities at
play, but focuses on hegemonic masculinity as the most relevant social structure to the perpetuation
of economic abuse. See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 25 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann
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Awareness and research of economic abuse are relatively new but
growing, both in law8 and social sciences, 9 indicating that myriad forms
of economic abuse and financial coercion take place within families. Most
research on economic abuse in the family has focused on intimate
partners, 10 and most research shows that economic abuse is a gendered
phenomenon 11 with devastating consequences for women’s safety,
agency, and economic sustainability. Economic abuse can occur at any
stage of a relationship and may take place both independently and in
conjunction with other types of violence: including physical, sexual, and
C. McGinley eds., 2012); NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND
PRIVILEGE 21 (2010) [hereinafter DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION] . Additionally, the division between
masculinity and femininity in a world in which identity is performed in various ways carries the risk
of entrenching stereotypes. However, the goal here is to acknowledge that for the most part, economic
abuse is a gendered phenomenon, and to challenge the gendered premises that enable it to occur.
8. Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339 (2014); Littwin, supra note 3; Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered
Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
363 (2013) [hereinafter Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit]; Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145 (2015)
[hereinafter Johnson, Changing Course]; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5.
9. Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 563 (2008); Olufunmilayo I. Fawole, Economic Violence to Women and Girls: Is
it Receiving the Necessary Attention?, 9 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 167 (2008); Judy L. Postmus
et al., Measuring Economic Abuse in the Lives of Survivors: Revising the Scale of Economic Abuse,
22 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 692 (2015); Judy L. Postmus et al., Understanding Economic Abuse
in the Lives of Survivors, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 412 (2012); Cynthia K. Sanders,
Economic Abuse in the Lives of Women Abused by an Intimate Partner: A Qualitative Study, 21
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 3 (2015); Amanda Mathisen Stylianou et al., Measuring Abusive
Behaviors: Is Economic Abuse a Unique Form of Abuse?, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3186
(2013); Prue Cameron, Relationship Problems and Money: Women Talk about Financial Abuse,
WOMEN’S
INFORMATION
4
(2014),
WIRE
http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=3938c7bf-ab6b-4b0e-b2d356177777334b&subId=411337 [http://perma.cc/2ZL2-NRD5]; Marilyn Howard & Amy Skipp,
Unequal, Trapped and Controlled: Women’s Experience of Financial Abuse and Potential
Implications for Universal Credit, WOMEN’S AID & TRADE UNION CONGRESS (2015),
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/UnequalTrappedControlled.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KF3JFKCX]; Nicola Sharp-Jeffs, A Review of Research and Policy on Financial Abuse Within Intimate
Partner Relationships (Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit (CWASU)), LONDON METRO. UNIV.
2015, http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-university/london-met-documents/
faculties/faculty-of-social-sciences-and-humanities/research/child-and-woman-abuse-studiesunit/Review-of-Research-and-Policy-on-Financial-Abuse.pdf [http://perma.cc/E728-SKRG].
10. See supra note 9. For a study focused on elderly abuse, see Thomas L. Hafemeister,
Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings, in ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT
AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 382 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003).
11. Although gender is somewhat controversial in social sciences literature on domestic
violence, it is apparent that dimensions of domestic violence that implicate control are gendered.
Littwin, supra note 3, at 978–81. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF
WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIVES 198–227 (2007); see also Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen
Side of Domestic Violence, N.Y. ST. B. J. 40, 41 (2011).
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emotional violence. 12 However, it is important to understand economic
abuse in its own right because it has broad implications for women’s
economic emancipation more generally, and because without a deeper
understanding of the determinants of economic abuse, a legal response
can do little to end the cycle of violence. 13 Producing fundamental legal
change requires understanding the premises underlying the phenomenon
and then imagining a path towards change. 14
This Article illustrates how economic abuse is socio-legally made
possible, through the use of new insights derived from the growing
literature on masculinities theory and through an examination of the legal
history of male power in the family and the market. Explanations about
intimate partner violence, mainly physical and sexual abuse, tend to see
the violence primarily as an exertion of male control over women. 15
Masculinities theory offers an additional theoretical underpinning for
understanding (rather than accepting) economic abuse, and along with the
history of breadwinning, points to the deep roots that provide a fertile
ground for it to occur. It shows that eradicating economic abuse is
extremely difficult because it is deeply ingrained in the interplay of
hegemonic masculinity as violent, aggressive, and economically
domineering and is long embedded in institutions, such as the family and
the market.
This Article demonstrates how economic abuse is ingrained in
notions of violence that are endemic to hegemonic masculinity and linked
to seemingly more benign notions of male breadwinning, which are also
closely tied to hegemonic masculinity. Both violence and breadwinning
have historically been gendered male. 16 Dimensions of control and
12. Chien-Chung Huang et al., Economic Abuse, Physical Violence and Union Formation, 35
CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV. REV. 780, 785–86 (2013).
13. See Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political–and Economic: Rethinking Domestic
Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387 (2007) (arguing that global economic changes, greater economic
strains, and domestic violence are correlated).
14. See Kathryn Abrams, Destabilizing Domesticity, 32 CONN. L. REV. 281, 282 (1999).
15. See Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police Officers
Who Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Goodmark, Hands
Up at Home] (explaining that domestic violence of police officers has been linked to masculinity).
16. Of course, women have always worked, and for decades many have supported themselves
and their families. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future: Introducing Constructive
Feminism for the Twenty-First Century – A New Paradigm for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 6
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 407 (2012) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future]; Arianne Renan
Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation: Decent Work and Decent Families, 33 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 119, 147 (2012) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family
Regulation] (distinguishing ideas on marriage based on class, immigration, and work status and
showing how the male-breadwinner ideal was inscribed in law); Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting
Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55
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breadwinning are rife in hegemonic masculinity and have made economic
abuse seem all the more “natural,” all the less problematic, and extremely
difficult to overcome. This Article contends that neglecting to account for
and be cognizant of the significance of hegemonic masculinity and the
history which enables it, may significantly limit seeing possible avenues
of potential redress. It is through the complex understanding of economic
abuse that we can contemplate measures to unravel the bonds between
masculinities, money, and control that are at the heart of economic abuse.
Moreover, this Article illustrates how gender identity, which is widely
recognized as germane to domestic violence, but is also often critiqued for
its disregard of other structures of power, 17 is embedded in a historical,
socio-legal structure of the market and the family. This Article is therefore
an effort to bring domestic violence gender-based analysis into a broader
conversation about the market and the family by making the connection
between the construction of hegemonic masculinity through these
institutions and the way law has enabled economic abuse to be
perpetuated.
This Article shows how identity is embedded in social structure and
contends that economic abuse is not merely an “individual” matter
requiring individual-oriented solutions, but rather a social one, based on a
particular historically based construction of relationships between the law,
the market, and the family. This link between identity and social structure
promotes the possibility to imagine not only individual-based remedies,
but structural transformations to put an end to economic abuse. Such
intervention requires an undertaking much larger and more diffuse than
suggesting a revision to criminal statutes to account for economic abuse
or an expansion of the purview of civil protection orders, although such
expansion may be required. I suggest two overarching principles: (1)
destabilizing hegemonic masculinity, including a relinquishment of
economic dominance as its staple, on the one hand, and an expansion of
men’s other productive roles in the family, on the other; 18 and (2)
promoting women’s agency by enhancing their economic and social
resilience through resources and legal institutions.

(2016) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII]. Similarly, violence also is not merely the
province of men, but women are disproportionately facing the threat of violence in their intimate lives.
See Ruth Colker, Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383 (2016).
17. Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic
Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 221, 224 (2013).
18. Some men, of course, may already take important caretaking roles in their families, yet
according to masculinities theory, hegemonic masculinity, nonetheless, pressures men into certain
gendered roles. See Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 28, and infra parts III and IV.
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Part II provides an overview of the existing literature on economic
abuse and describes the social science data on its manifestations, outlining
its characteristics. Part III provides a legal history of male control within
the family, pointing to the the market, the family, and the law as
interdependent institutions that evolved in tandem. It also explains how
these institutions form the background to the “naturalization” of economic
abuse and how they currently provide socio-legal structure that enables
economic control by husbands. It shows that the law’s construction of the
“ideal worker” norm has contributed to men’s economic supremacy.
Moreover, the law’s “laissez-faire” approach to financial management
during marriage has been complacent in the perpetuation of economic
abuse and is misguided, given new insights from masculinities theories
that stress the Gordian knot between hegemonic masculinity and
economic control over the family. These insights, illustrated in Part IV,
concern the way hegemonic masculinity is constructed through economic
providership, control, violence, and the differentiation from women.
Taken together, Parts III and IV explain how economic abuse is enabled
and provide a way to think about power in this new age of marriage
equality. Part V points to possible avenues for change and the fundamental
transformations that ending economic abuse entails. The epilogue, Part
VI, concludes on an optimistic note, hoping that such transformations are
within reach.
II. INTRODUCING ECONOMIC ABUSE
Social scientists have defined economic abuse as tactics that control
a woman’s ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources, thus
threatening her economic security and potential for self-sufficiency. 19 Yet
economic abuse has largely been ignored by the legal system, which has
focused on physical and sexual harms, rather than on manifestations of
coercive control. 20 Economic abuse is rarely publicly discussed, 21 perhaps
because it may occur in what otherwise seem like non-violent intimate
19. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565. While economic abuse may occur in the reverse, most
of the literature suggests it is usually operated on women. See supra note 11.
20. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38–42. See Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 149
(“Domestic violence policy has . . . prioritized the narratives of physical violence, crime and danger
over women’s experience of the broad-range of abuse to which they are subjected.”).
21. As exceptions, see Ginger Dean, Financial Abuse: 6 Signs and What You Can Do About It,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ginger-dean/financial-abuse-6signs-a_b_5627463.html [http://perma.cc/8LFC-7S9T]; Laura Shin, ‘I’ll Take Care Of The Bills’:
FORBES
(Mar.
19,
2015),
The
Slippery
Slope
Into
Financial
Abuse,
www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/19/ill-take-care-of-the-bills-the-slippery-slope-intofinancial-abuse [http://perma.cc/8JNY-C3V3].
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partner relationships. Some claim economic abuse is becoming a bigger
problem during volatile economic times and that it is now on the rise. 22
Economic abuse often results in growing economic dependence, lack of
resources, uncertain economic future, homelessness, poverty, and
decreased health. 23 In this Part, I present the practice of economic abuse,
describe the data accumulated thus far on its myriad manifestations, and
outline its characteristics.
Economic abuse can be defined as limiting control over economic
and financial resources to which a person is entitled, by an intimate
partner, in order to accomplish control by the partner or make that person
dependent upon the partner. 24 Examples documented include stark
quotidian images of women being forced to beg for money from their
husbands, 25 being put on allowances even when the family is well-off, 26
or being denied access to basic necessities by the husbands’ withholding
of them under lock and key. 27 Common manifestations of economic abuse
may include forbidding work, sabotaging employment opportunities,
preventing the abused partner from attending job training or advancement
opportunities, controlling how money is spent, not allowing the abused
partner access to bank accounts or credit cards, restricting access to
financial information, liquidating joint accounts, charging items on the
abused partner’s credit cards, not consulting the abused partner in
investment or banking decisions, forcing the abused partner to run up
large amounts of debt on joint accounts, hiding assets and financial
resources, or forcing the abused partner to turn over public benefits. 28
22. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. See Scott M. Stringer, Economic Abuse: Untold Cost of
Domestic Violence, OFFICE OF THE MANHATTAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT, (Oct. 2012),
https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/ilr.cornell.edu/files/Economic-Abuse-Untold-Cost-of-DV.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8CJN-2PDT].
23. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 568; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1123. Some
note the special susceptibility of immigrant women, who have limited economic resources, limited
English proficiency, weak connections to their community, or weak networks of support to economic
abuse. See Conner, supra note 8. But see Pollet, supra note 11 (arguing economic abuse affects
women of all social strata).
24. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565; see Maureen Outlaw, No One Type of Intimate Partner
Abuse: Exploring Physical and Non-Physical Abuse Among Intimate Partners, 24 J. FAMILY
VIOLENCE 263 (2009).
25. Although economic abuse affects non-married partners, most literature refers to
husbands/wives. Outlaw, supra note 24.
26. Howard & Skipp, supra note 9; see Susan Lloyd & Nina Taluc, The Effects of Male
Violence on Female Employment, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 370 (1999); Angela M. Moe &
Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering and Violence on Women’s Work and
Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29 (2004).
27. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1109.
28. See Conner, supra note 8, at 364–66; Littwin, supra note 3, at 983–92; About Financial
Abuse, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://nnedv.org/content/about-financial-
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Other features include preventing financial support (which may be
necessary for leading a reasonable lifestyle), forcing the abused partner to
cede control of her assets, preventing the abused partner from making
decisions in relation to the household economy, and creating debts by one
partner while imposing them on the abused partner. 29 Economic abuse
may manifest in registering all the family property in the name of only
one of the spouses, stealing money and destroying family assets,
withholding information about money, not complying with one’s
undertaking to care for children, and imposing the financial burden on the
caretaking party. 30 Such features often have long term effects on women’s
employment, credit scores, and financial sustainability.
These features have been organized by social scientists into three
main categories. 31 The first is restrictions on accumulating resources. This
category includes behaviors that prevent the abused partner from earning
a living with her own capabilities. At times, the abused partner is
prevented by means of an outright restriction, and other times by means
of thwarting her attempts to arrive at work interviews, preventing the
issuance of a driver’s license, imposing child-care responsibilities,
restricting her ability to procure financial resources independently, or to
acquire education. 32 The second category is restrictions on the use of
available resources and prevention of information. 33 Examples of this
category include restricting the abused partner from withdrawing cash
from joint accounts, or allocating small amounts of money to her while
preventing access to such accounts; restricting the use of a car, credit card,
or check book; and concealing information concerning the financial
situation of the spouses. The third category of economic abuse includes
abuse/ [http://perma.cc/YJ6X-7WWN] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); see also Economic Abuse Fact
Sheet, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.mmgconnect.com/
projects/userfiles/file/dce-stop_now/ncadv_economic_abuse_fact_sheet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VK5W-2KXS] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); Research Report from Eve Buzawa,
Gerald T. Hotaling, Andrew Klein, & James Byrne, Response to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active
Court Setting—Final Report, to U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 2000) (unpublished report); Cynthia K.
Sanders, Domestic Violence, Economic Abuse, and Implications of a Program for Building Economic
Resources for Low-Income Women: Findings from Interviews with Participants in a Women’s
Economic Action Program, CTR. SOC. DEV., GEORGE WARREN BROWN SCH. SOC. WORK (Apr.
2007), https://csd.wustl.edu/publications/documents/rp07-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/YQN3-KEK5].
29. Cameron, supra note 9, at 5. See Conner, supra note 8; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra
note 5.
30. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. See Moving Ahead Through Financial Management,
FOUND.
(May
2010),
http://purplepurse.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
ALLSTATE
moving_ahead_through_financial_management_module_two.pdf [http://perma.cc/TU4A-Q49B].
31. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 563, 565–67.
32. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565.
33. Id. at 566.
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exploitation of resources. 34 This category consists of stealing family
money, betting on it, and destroying property. Such exploitation can also
manifest itself in forcing the abused partner to work while controlling her
earnings 35 or creating a coerced debt (a nonconsensual, credit-related
transaction which includes taking out credit cards in a partner’s name);
forcing her to take out a loan or sign a quitclaim deed to a home; or
excessively charging a partner’s credit card. 36 The common denominator
of all these forms of behavior is that the spouse creates an increased
dependence of the abused partner on her spouse, and also that these
behaviors constitute a means for continuing such dependence.
This phenomenon is not unique to the United States.
Notwithstanding the cultural and social variations, economic abuse is
increasingly gaining recognition as a social problem in countries as

34.
35.
36.
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diverse as Australia, 37 Egypt, 38 England, 39 Israel, 40 Lebanon, 41 and
Turkey, 42 yet with the core centrality of gender apparent. Within the
37. In Australia, more than 200 documented cases’ descriptions were remarkably alike; thus,
for example, on a regular basis a woman was prevented from driving a car to visit friends or family
members because of the costs of gas; a women was required to keep a book accounting for every
dollar spent; and a mother of three was not allowed to do the shopping for the household, and when
she was allowed her husband would check each item in the shopping cart and would decide which
goods were necessary to be bought. Women also reported that their spouses would use all their
financial resources for gambling purposes. See Cameron, supra note 9. Another study in Australia
discovered a phenomenon of men who had deprived their spouses of money to the point where they
had no possibility of buying food, clothing, hygienic products, and travelling on public transport. It
was further discovered that men made use of the family money for themselves, pursuant to their wish
alone, to the extent that the wife was barred from making any financial decisions. Elizabeth Branigan,
“His Money or Our Money?” Financial Abuse of Women in Intimate Partner Relationships, REPORT
BY THE COBURG BRUNSWICK CMTY. LEGAL & FIN. COUNSELLING CTR. INC. 20–22 (2004),
www.communitylaw.org.au/clc_morelandhome/cb_pages/images/238_Financial_Abuse_Projec.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NXS4-DHCX].
38. A study conducted in Egypt among women who experienced economic abuse discovered
that 25% of the women reported that their spouse had forced them to take out a loan for family
purposes in their names exclusively, and 14% of the women said that their spouses refused to
withdraw money for their personal expenses. Ibrahim F. Kharboush et al., Spousal Violence in Egypt,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 2010), http://www.prb.org/pdf10/spousalviolenceegypt.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5S7-VNSH]; Jinan Usta et al., Economic Abuse in Lebanon: Experiences
and Perceptions, 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 356, 358 (2013).
39. In England, women stated that when they were allowed to use credit they were forced to
explain and justify every charge, and they were constantly in fear since their needs and the reasons
they gave for them were never considered justifiable reasons in the eyes of their spouses. There were
also descriptions of cases where women worked and their husbands would react with jealousy and
suspicion, confiscating their credit cards while allocating them a daily cash allowance. When
interviewees were asked how the economic abuse had expressed itself, 76% of them responded that
their spouses concealed financial information from them, 68% noted that important financial
decisions were passed without their knowledge, 65% were required to detail how they spent their
money, and 54% described how their spouses forced them to ask them for money when they needed
it. Howard & Skipp, supra note 9, at 22–23, 29.
40. In Israel, a survey found that 5% of the women who live with spouses and who run a joint
household report that they are not free to independently manage their own or the joint bank account,
even when it comes to daily expenses such as buying food and medicine; 21% of those surveyed
reported that their spouses examine their economic expenses; and 9% of those surveyed noted that
they required the approval of their spouse to make any purchase or to buy anything; and 14% noted
that they had no information about their spouses’ income and property. Other studies reveal that
among applications for social services in the hospitals and in the community with respect to spousal
violence, approximately 4% of the applicants complained about economic abuse and/or withholding
economic rights. See Arianne Renan Barzilay & Shirley Youseri, Economic Abuse in the Family, 39
TEL AVIV L. REV. 613 (2016) (on file with author).
41. A study conducted among women in Lebanon found that 45% of the women who were
interviewed experienced violence which was expressed in an economic way on the part of their
spouse. Usta et al., supra note 38, at 358.
42. In a study in Turkey in which more than one thousand women took part, it was discovered
that approximately 25% of them experienced or were experiencing economic abuse. Taner Akar et
al., The Prevalence of Domestic Violence Against Women Among a Group Woman: Ankara, Turkey:
Domestic Violence Against Women in Ankara, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 449, 451 (2010).
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framework of the family, economic abuse has gender features, and most
studies show that the man was preventing the woman from access to the
money. 43
Economic abuse has begun to gain recognition as a genuine form of
domestic violence. The U.S. Department of Justice curtly includes it in its
definition of domestic violence. 44 Yet economic abuse remains rather
peripheral in domestic violence law, policy, and scholarship, which still
primarily focuses on physical and sexual harms. 45 Economic abuse lacks
a history and a theory with which to understand it, which may inform
possible avenues of redress. Scholars have claimed that economic abuse
is a real harm to women, and several organizations 46 have responded by
articulating the manifestations of economic abuse. However, economic
abuse still suffers marginal recognition at best. This may be because,
unlike physical domestic violence, which we have been educated on by
feminist lawmaking to reject as a prerogative of the marital relationship, 47
economic abuse seems more benign, more ordinary, and even more
natural (except perhaps in circumstances when accompanied by physical
or sexual harm). Its seemingly naturalness stems from its deep roots in
both coverture and the history of gender roles in the market and in the
family. I now turn to this history. 48
43. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. There were also few reported cases of same-sex economic
abuse. See Cameron, supra note 9, at 15.
44. It defines domestic violence as “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is
used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. Domestic
violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions
that influence another person. This includes any behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate,
isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone.” Domestic
DEP’T
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence
Violence,
U.S.
[http://perma.cc/3ECH-7EJF] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
45. On the marginal place of economic abuse, see GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38–42;
Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8.
46. These include the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Home, NAT’L COAL.
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/ [http://perma.cc/MM8X-ZMSP] (last visited
Oct. 25, 2016); Redevelopment Opportunities for Women’s Economic Action (REAP) in St. Louis,
Missouri, Home, FAMILY RES. CTR., https://www.frcmo.org/services/row/ [http://perma.cc/9ZJ4EB8G] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016); The Allstate Foundation in partnership with the National Network
to End Violence (NNEDV); NNEDV & The Allstate Foundation Celebrate 10 Years of Economic
Empowerment Programs for Survivors, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://nnedv.org/latest_update/nnedv-the-allstate-foundation-celebrate-10-years-of-economicempowerment-programs-for-survivors/ [http://perma.cc/Y37B-JH2R] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
47. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 5, 13-16,
20 (2000).
48. A comprehensive history of women’s subordination in the family and the market since
coverture is beyond the scope of this Article. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3, 93-94 (2000); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY:
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 22 (2001);
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III. BETWEEN COVERTURE AND BREADWINNING
The family, the market, and the law are interrelated institutions. This
Part shows that economic abuse is a remnant of coverture ideology,
modified through the supremacy of the male-breadwinner/femaledependent model, and that it is enabled through the primacy of “idealworker” norms and a general legal aversion to interfere in the private
financial matters in an ongoing marriage. It seems that an important part
of the marginalization of economic abuse and its trivialization stems from
two basic assumptions, which are still significantly conceived of as
natural: (1) the family as a private, autonomous space in which
government should not intervene, 49 and (2) the conception of the husband
as the main breadwinner and therefore the domineering economic
figure. 50 These two assumptions, both the myth of the family as a private
autonomous space and the conception of the husband as financial
controller, are related to the age-old legal doctrine of coverture, features
of which continue to reverberate still today. 51 The marginal recognition of
economic abuse in the legal system 52 is entrenched in the fear of entering
into the private sphere of the family and “interfering” with the intimate
economic relationship, where the husband’s day-to-day control of the
family’s finances is conceived as natural and generally inappropriate for
judicial intervention.
Historically, the law has formed gendered identities for wives and
husbands. 53 Marriage was a profoundly hierarchical relationship.54 The
coverture doctrine that existed in Anglo-American law for centuries
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 93-166 (2000); Deborah Dinner, The
Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.
REV. 415 (2011). My aim is to highlight the features in the history of gender, law, work, and family
that have allowed and continue to enable economic abuse to take hold.
49. See LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW 40 (2002). For the theoretical incoherence of the non-intervention doctrine, see Frances E. Olsen,
The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985). For the historical
inaccuracy of this myth, see Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16
(showing that labor regulation has constructed a particular family model).
50. Kathryn Abrams has critiqued the “widely-held” notion that when the husband is the
primary wage earner and the wife does the lion’s share of family-care work, the man “owns” the
property. Abrams, supra note 14, at 281.
51. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, 97–120 (2014); Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2127 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, The Modernization of Martial Status Law]; Reva B. Siegel, “The
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) [hereinafter
Siegel, The Rule of Love].
52. See supra note 200 and infra notes 220-264.
53. Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 186 (2000).
54. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 2.
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transformed a man and a woman who entered in marriage into husband
and wife. 55 Marriage consolidated the legal persona of both individuals
into the legal persona of the husband. The wife became “covered” by her
husband and was submerged into his legal existence. The significance of
this submergence, inter alia, was that the wife lost control of her property,
and control of her property and performance of activities with her
financial resources was granted to the husband,56 who in turn was required
to support her. 57
For generations, under the widespread family model, the husband
acquired his wife and her services, and his role was to provide for her.58
The coverture doctrine enabled physical violence in the family as a
“natural” offshoot thereof. Because the husband was responsible for his
wife’s behavior, he was given the power to “educate” her, even by
physical force. 59 Anglo-American common law authorized a husband to
strike his wife so long as he did not cause her permanent damage, as an
aspect of male control of the family. 60 Violence was protected from legal
intervention by the husband’s prerogative and by the veil of family
privacy. 61 The idea of family privacy over ongoing mundane family
affairs perpetuated the gendered power relationship and contributed to the
subjugation of women by men within the family. 62 The feminist struggle,
regarding physical and sexual abuse, raised awareness to the need to
understand what was happening in the domestic sphere. 63 Ultimately, it
was established that the husband has no right to act with physical violence
toward his wife. However, the courts still continued to relate differently
to the striking of a woman within the framework of marriage, for fear of
interfering in the privacy of the family. 64 Hence, through the doctrine of

55. “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765).
56. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 93–106.
57. Id. at 115–18, 136–37.
58. Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical Family Law,
13 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN L. 361, 367–68 (2012).
59. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 115–16.
60. Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2118.
61. Id. at 2196–206.
62. SCHNEIDER, supra note 47, at 87.
63. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 4 (2009).
64. Littwin, supra note 3, at 955–57.
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coverture and its ideological remnants, such as the assumption of family
autonomy, different types of violence in the family have been condoned.65
Even after coverture was critiqued by feminists and was changed as
a result of their efforts and other socio-economic forces, 66 courts have
continued to invoke it in “an idiom peculiar to the industrial era,” 67
defining the role of the husband in the family as the family breadwinner. 68
Reva Siegel notes that “notwithstanding the putative abolition of
coverture, women in the industrial era found themselves economically
disempowered in marriage and impoverished at divorce—and still find
themselves so today.” 69 She argues that the changes in that antiquated
body of law were merely modernized to enable the continuation of
regulated gender relations. 70 While coverture doctrine formally changed,
the deep conception of the husband’s financial control of family assets has
continued to dominate, given most husbands’ traditional breadwinning
roles. These roles were constructed via the Industrial Revolution, which
created a separation between the domestic-private sphere and the marketpublic sphere. 71
The Industrial Revolution transformed the majority of working
people from self-employed agricultural workers to wage earners working
for large industrial firms. 72 Unlike the pre-industrial, agrarian era, in
which all members of the family worked together to sustain the family,
the Industrial Revolution invented an iconic figure of dependency—the
housewife. 73 This figure melded women’s traditional sociological and

65. Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2150-74.
66. Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L.
REV. CIR. 126 (2015).
67. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 51, at 2129.
68. Id. at 2127 (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 245 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1922)), “[A]t common law the
husband and wife are under obligation to each other to perform certain duties. The husband to bring
home the bacon, so to speak, and to furnish a home, while on the wife devolved the duty to keep said
home in a habitable condition.”).
69. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 51, at 2131.
70. Id. at 2132, 2140. See Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (explaining that the
women’s rights movement originally sought to abolish the doctrine of marital service by enacting
joint property laws that would give husbands and wives equal rights in family assets).
71. See Cahn, supra note 53. For a critique of the separation narrative, see HASDAY, supra note
51, at 67–96; Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499–501, 1507 (1983).
72. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Women at Work: Towards an Inclusive Narrative of the Rise
of the Regulatory State, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 169, 175 (2008) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay,
Women at Work].
73. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the
U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 318 (1994).
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political subordination with new economic dependence. 74 The Industrial
Revolution reorganized work and family and created a stark line between
the public and the private spheres. 75 Men and women were engaged in
separate spheres of activity in the nineteenth century: men in the market,
business, and the professions, and women in the home. 76 Women were
largely “drafted” into motherhood and family-care, while men’s
caretaking was “voluntary.” 77 The male-breadwinner/woman-dependent
model established a gender system that sent men to the marketplace while
requiring women to perform unpaid domestic work. 78 Family-care work
and productive work became separated, rendering women’s work
economically invisible and making them economically dependent on the
earnings of men. 79 Subsequently and pragmatically that usually meant that
authority over resources and allocation of duties rested with the
husband. 80 Although the husband-breadwinner/wife-dependent model
was unrealistic for many groups, 81 this model assumed a “naturalness,”
which was institutionalized and supported by the law, 82 with the marriage
relationship constituting a pillar of the family. 83
74. Id. Although not all families conformed to this ideal, especially many working-class,
immigrants, and black women, whom have long worked in the market. See LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM
WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER: THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 18201980 13–30 (1985); Renan Barzilay, Women at Work, supra note 72, at 175; Marion Crain, “Where
Have All the Cowboys Gone?” Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1877, 1903 (1999).
75. JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATETWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1998); see Pierre Bourdieu, On the Family as a Realized
Category, 13 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 19, 20–21 (1996) (considering the family “a well-founded
fiction”); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1 (1996).
76. Of course, some women, particularly immigrant, black, and working-class women had
worked in the marketplace. See JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, WOMEN ADRIFT: INDEPENDENT WAGE
EARNERS IN CHICAGO 1880-1930, at XVII (1988); WEINER, supra note 74, at 4.
77. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1451-57 (1991).
78. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 120, 128 (20th anniversary ed. 2003); Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679, 686 (2011) (discussing the price women pay for domesticity); Laura T.
Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2005) (explaining the
impracticalities of the family wage system).
79. STACEY, supra note 75, at 8 (“Women devoted increased attention to nurturing fewer . . .
children as mothering came to be . . . [a] demanding vocation [and] . . . [l]ove and companionship
became the ideal purposes of marriages . . . .”).
80. Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 127.
81. STACEY, supra note 75, at 5–10.
82. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 150 (1995).
83. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1251–
52 (2010).
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Women have historically been marginalized and excluded from the
locus of money-making. Although women have always worked inside the
home, and increasingly in the market, their market work was often
considered a mere detour until marriage. 84 When women engaged in
marketplace labor they were paid less than men for the same jobs. Wages
were for the breadwinners: men supporting their families. 85 Women were
not considered real workers or family breadwinners deserving of adequate
wages. Money women earned in the market was considered “special
money,” coined as “pin money” or “allowance,” marking it as different
from wages. 86 Even after women had begun to enter in growing numbers
into the paid workforce in the early decades of the twentieth century, 87
during times of economic downturn, the focus of public concern about
unemployment was on working men, who were understood as providers
for their families. 88 Scholars contend that the New Deal helped re-erect
the husband’s place in the family as the necessary breadwinner and
provider: 89 laws were aimed at breadwinners and heads of families,
resting on the assumption that women were not real workers and family
providers. 90 To this day, scholars note that the labor market is gendered
male. It is premised on an “ideal worker,” one that is unencumbered by
familial caregiving responsibilities and is free to work long hours at any
time. 91 Law itself has structured workplace norms that favor “ideal
workers,” and has largely failed to accommodate those with family-care
responsibility. 92 Today, concentration of wealth and power in the market
is linked to top executive ranks and the most lucrative professions—which
are still disproportionately male. 93 Despite advances in women’s

84.
85.

Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 133, 145.
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 7 (updated ed. 1990); Cahn, supra note 53, at 191.
86. Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: “Special Monies,” 95 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 342, 344 (1989).
87. Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 140.
88. See COTT, supra note 48, at 172.
89. Id. at 158, 172–74; Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note
16, at 143.
90. See Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 144–45.
91. In regards to the ideal worker norm, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 20 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER].
92. Id.; Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future, supra note 16; Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title
VII, supra note 16; Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003).
93. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 190.
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marketplace labor participation and earning, 94 women still earn less than
men, and mothers, in particular, have even lower earnings. 95
Within marriage, women are disproportionately the individuals who
provide care to others. 96 Men still take fewer parental leaves and actual
parental roles have changed relatively little.97 Mothers and caregivers are
often marginalized in the workforce because of “ideal worker” norms of
extremely long hours that assume a full-time family caretaker at home,
and are also marginalized in their families because of the notion that he
who earns the money owns it. As Kathryn Abrams observed, it is a widely
held premise or assumption that when the husband is the primary wage
earner and the wife does the lion’s share of family-care work, the man
“owns” the property. 98 Even as women earn more money, these deeprooted assumptions about men’s economic roles and privileges seem to
continue.
As the twentieth century neared a close, a postindustrial labor market
enmeshed in a postindustrial society gave increasing rise to post-modern
families. 99 Today, law and society have opened up a diverse array of
familial relationships, as same-sex partnerships, single-parent households,
and dual-earner households are becoming increasingly common. 100 Yet,
for most heterosexual relationships, elements of the traditional family
have remained intact. Many feminists have identified caregiving as a
practice to which a wide range of women are still socialized. 101 Women
still conduct more family-care work and earn less in the market than men,
thus making them more dependent on male earners. 102 The current

94. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995 (2015)
(noting the progress that women have made in the labor market). The gaps have nonetheless narrowed
mostly at the lower paying, non-skilled jobs. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 197.
95. Cahn, supra note 53, at 188.
96. Colker, supra note 16, at 388.
97. Cahn, supra note 53, at 184. Notwithstanding changes from previous generations, and
changes due to times of economic unrest, see KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE
BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 16-18, 179-88 (2013) (asserting that economic and
cultural changes have transformed the meaning of fatherhood among the urban poor).
98. Abrams, supra note 14, at 281–82.
99. STACEY, supra note 75, at 16–17.
100. Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The Stories of Troxel v.
Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 111 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
101. FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 7-9, 47-48; Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency:
Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 816 (1999) [hereinafter
Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency].
102. See Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, at 32 (2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/chapters/
economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/PW4F-LH4P] (stating that women still conduct more family-care work
and earn less in the market than men).
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marketplace workforce includes significantly larger numbers of fathers
than mothers with children under eighteen years old, 103 although singleparent families are predominantly led by females.104 In financially
rewarding industries, workplace culture and the practice of working
extremely long hours remain intact. 105 More generally, the hours now
worked by the average American worker equate to roughly five extra
workweeks a year for the Swedish worker, and are substantially more than
those worked by workers in Canada, Germany, or France. 106 American
employment structures have largely remained premised on the malebreadwinner family model, which assumes a caregiver at home, thus
furthering the prevalence of “ideal worker” norms. 107 Part-time and
flexible work, often unaccompanied by benefits, is severely penalized
financially and unavailable for many rewarding jobs. 108
Notwithstanding significant changes, remnants of coverture continue
to reverberate today. 109 The history of casting males as breadwinners, in
which women belonged to the domestic sphere and men to the market
sphere, strengthened the husband’s financial control in the family, making
the hetero-normative family model one in which female dependency
persists. 110 It emerges therefore, that in the past the financial control of the
husband in the family was understood as natural owing to the coverture
doctrine, while nowadays, in a significant sense, it is still conceived of as
natural owing to the establishment of the husband as the main
breadwinner. Male domination over economic resources continues to fuel
intimate partner violence in general, 111 and more specifically makes

103. See HILDA L. SOLIS & KEITH HALL, U.S. DEP’T LABOR & U.S. BUREAU LABOR
STATISTICS, REPORT 1018, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 13 (2009),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/464C-MYQD]; U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE & EXEC. OF OFFICE THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND
ECON. WELL-BEING 27 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
Women_in_America.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3BQ-Y7Z2] [hereinafter WOMEN IN AMERICA].
104. WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 103, at 13.
105. See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 59 (2003).
106. Statistical
Index,
ORG.
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.
(2012),
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS [http://perma.cc/HX2M-N6JA].
107. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 91, at 20.
108. See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 105, at 23–24; Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the
Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283 (2003).
109. HASDAY, supra note 51, at 97–120; Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law,
supra note 51, at 2127; Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2117.
110. Arianne Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, Baby: Reflections on Capato’s Legacy, 46
IND. L. REV. 557, 570 (2013) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own]; Fraser & Gordon,
supra note 73, at 318; STACY, supra note 75, at 8.
111. Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Pollet, supra note 11, at 41.
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economic abuse seem natural and benign. Although unmarried
perpetrators may inflict economic abuse, features of marriage, such as
joint bank accounts, property titled only in a husband’s name, 112 and the
general convention of “what’s mine is yours” may make economic abuse
easier to carry out and much harder to resist.
Law has played a significant role in the perpetuation of economic
abuse. Notwithstanding that women have made progress in the workforce
by narrowing some income and earnings gaps between the sexes,113 what
happens outside the home does not linearly translate into what happens
inside the home because women’s earning of money does not necessarily
lead to them controlling income. 114 Sociologists note that “[r]egardless of
how money is earned outside the home, only a minority of households
manage money within the home in ways that equitably benefit both
women and men,” 115 and that most families’ money management work to
the disadvantage of women. 116 Today women enter into contracts, own
property, and earn wages, but as Angela Littwin noticed, “although the
law retreated from its de jure commitment to male economic supremacy,
it does not monitor de facto economic rights husbands and wives
conferred on each other during their marriages.” 117 Importantly, during a
112. Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Sanders, supra note 28, at 32.
113. Elizabeth R. Carter, The Illusion of Equality: The Failure of the Community Property
Reform to Achieve Management Equality, 48 IND. L. REV. 853, 853 (2015).
114. Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse: Allocative Systems and Inequality in Couple
Households, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 354, 359–62 (2006) (explaining that many women, already
disadvantaged in earnings, either absolutely or relative to their partners, are in couples in which men’s
control over or withholding of income may reproduce or exacerbate their earnings disadvantage).
115. Jeffrey Dew et al., Examining the Relationship Between Financial Issues and Divorce, 61
FAM. REL. 615, 617 (2012).
116. Kenney, supra note 114, at 354; Carter, supra note 113, at 853-54.
117. Littwin, supra note 3, at 955. Discriminatory “head-and-master” laws which de jure
granted the husband the exclusive right to manage and control marital property in both community
property and title states were successfully challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Marsha Levick, The Era and Family Law: Making
Equality Work for Men and Women, 23 J. FAM. L. 521, 539 (1984). Yet because of the doctrine of
marital privacy, courts generally do not intervene in families’ decision-making practices even when
the husband is the one making these decisions, rather than the family. Littwin, supra note 3, at 983–
85. The famous case of McGuire v. McGuire (59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953)), which declined to
intervene when a husband refused to purchase more than bare necessities for his wife, is still
representative of the courts’ inclination today. Littwin, supra note 3, at 984. Yet others have noted
that “much of recent family law has grown from rights developed under the family privacy theory,
which positively permits pluralism and a diversity of family forms to flourish.” Jane K. Stoever,
Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1015, 1039 (2014). Specifically, the doctrine of marital privacy has afforded women a number of
crucial protections, including access to abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that
the right to choose abortion is premised on right to privacy), and birth control, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that privacy rights grant a right to use contraceptives). For
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marriage, in common law states, the spouse that owns title controls the
assets, and given that men generally earn more money than women in the
market, men control most assets in the home. 118 Resource allocation
within the family thus “naturally” follows market outcomes. 119
The law remains generally supportive of earner-husbands’ decisions
on how to allocate resources within the family. 120 Even divorce, which
formally enables judicial distribution of property, usually results in each
party coming away from the marriage to return to the marketplace to make
their own way. 121 The law in most common law states perpetuates this
problem 122 by taking a hands-off approach on how spouses manage
money once it is brought into the home. 123 The practical and predictable
consequence of this “laissez-faire” approach is that the existing gender
power gap remains intact within heterosexual couples. 124 Anne Alstott has
posited that such privileging of private ordering without the right to
challenge market outcomes is itself an outcome of neoliberalism’s
architecture of tragedies as private. 125 This architecture coincides with
courts’ aversion to micromanage financial decisions during marriage. 126
a critique arguing that these reproductive rights cases should not have been decided on privacy
grounds but rather on the basis of equality, see Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male
Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52–53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia
Hennessey eds., 1984).
118. Cahn, supra note 53, at 187.
119. Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 28 (2014).
120. Id. at 33. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 998 (1995).
121. Alstott, supra note 119, at 34–35.
122. Carter, supra note 113, at 854. Community property states (in which the couple owns
marital assets jointly during the marriage) are not that different in this respect. In the past, formal
rules of male superiority in management of the community assets were common, making the husband
the sole manager of the property. Over time, the community property states began imposing more
meaningful limitations to the husband’s control by granting the wife some power to veto important
transactions and de jure male preference (the old head-and-master laws) was completely abandoned
by the 1980s. Yet, the gender neutral property management systems put instead, did not significantly
benefit women, because “money management remains a highly gendered activity—one that typically
operates to the disadvantage of the wife.” Id. at 863–70.
123. Alstott, supra note 119, at 33–34; Carter, supra note 113, at 854.
124. Alstott, supra note 119, at 33–34; Carter, supra note 113, at 854; Littwin, supra note 3, at
955.
125. Alstott, supra note 119, at 33. While Alstott notes domestic violence as an exception,
economic abuse is largely unrecognized and therefore her assertion remains representative in our
context.
126. On courts’ aversion to micromanage marriage, see Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains
in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225 (2011); Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful
Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders,
83 OR. L. REV. 945, 949 (2004) (“[F]amily law is largely premised on the belief that only minimal
state intervention is warranted absent the most egregious, near-fatal conduct, with the greatest
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The fact that the law does not de facto monitor the economic
allocations during marriage makes the legal system rely, to a significant
extent, on “male cooperation in the project of female economic
independence.” 127 Given new insights from masculinities theory, this
reliance seems grossly misguided. Insights from masculinities theory
demonstrate the inextricable relationship between economic control and
men’s sense of their masculinity, suggesting that relinquishing such power
is intrinsically tied to a denunciation of men’s sense of themselves as
masculine. It is these insights that the next Part explains.
IV. MASCULINITIES AND ECONOMIC ABUSE
A.

Preliminary Skepticism

A preliminary question may be asked: Why should masculinities
theory be relevant to a phenomenon that primarily negatively affects
women when one of the professed goals of masculinities theory is
bringing attention to men, their experiences, and how they are
constructed? 128 Yet it is exactly by coming to terms with the effects of
masculinities on gender relationships that masculinities theory, which
centers on men and their relationships among themselves almost
exclusively, 129 can produce insights that might help promote gender
equality for both men and women. Moreover, even masculinities scholars
do not suggest turning away from women because gender power dynamics
are asymmetrical, 130 and because of the fear that masculinities theory
would be used to reproduce patriarchy rather than eradicate it.131 On the
other hand, feminist theorists might wonder why masculinities theory
should be taken into account at all and why it is necessary to unpack
economic abuse through the lens of masculinities. A possible response is
that masculinities theory may teach us vital lessons about how men
acquire control and subjugate their subordinates. This understanding is an
emphasis on no-fault divorce as the means to expeditious resolution of the cases.”).
127. Littwin, supra note 3, at 955.
128. Martha Albertson Fineman has more broadly questioned the use of identity-based theories
as equality enhancing mechanisms. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism and Masculinities:
Questioning the Lure of Multiple Identities, in EXPLORING MASCULINITIES: FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY REFLECTIONS 16 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Michael Thomson eds., 2013); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619 (2013).
129. Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 27.
130. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 65.
131. Id. at 105–20; Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and
Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 419 (2010) [hereinafter Dowd, Asking the Man
Question].
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important step in dismantling patriarchy and promoting gender
equality. 132 It may be helpful for two additional, related reasons. First,
discussing masculinities theory seems like a promising opportunity to
bring men on board with the gender equality project. Such discussion may
promote awareness to the prices men pay for gender social constructs, and
may mobilize men towards changing these constructs. Second,
understanding the Gordian knot that is the connection between the
construction of hegemonic masculinity, domination of the family, and
economic domination, supports contemplating appropriate reactions to
the phenomenon that are informed by the way hegemonic masculinity is
established. This can effect a change in the connection between
hegemonic masculinity and economic control over the family, which is
particularly relevant in the context of economic abuse.
This potential to effect change is also why the perspective of
masculinities theory cannot be considered separately from insights
provided through feminist theories. 133 Thus, this Part explores “the man
question” of masculinities theory 134—interrogating where and how men
are situated in relation to the initiation and perpetration of economic
abuse. 135 Specifically, it explores whether and how hegemonic
masculinity works to provide a basis for economic abuse. However, it asks
“the man question” in a manner that is not often present in masculinities
scholarship. For instance, in the context of physical domestic violence,
masculinities researchers often suggest shifting the lens toward men,
noting that they too are victims of domestic abuse, and seeing how they
reproduce as adults the abuse they experienced during their childhood. 136
The path this Part follows is different, even if only because the study of
economic abuse is in its early stages of recognition and appears to have a
clear gender dimension. It does not inquire whether there are men who are
victims of economic abuse at the hands of their female partners (surely
there may be in certain contexts, although most research points to women
who suffer from economic abuse), but rather investigates the elements in
hegemonic masculinity that are related to the phenomenon—to violence
on one hand, and the family economy on the other. A similar path was
offered by masculinities researchers, but has not been applied for the most

132. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 30; Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra
note 131, at 419.
133. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 56.
134. Id. at 66.
135. See Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Gender, Masculinities, and Transition in
Conflicted Societies, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2009).
136. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 73–139.
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part. 137 Understanding economic abuse and using the perspective of
masculinities theory provides insights for feminist legal theorists to
contemplate a reaction to economic abuse.138 More broadly, it also sheds
light on the way power is established and reinforced in the family.
B.

Masculinities and Feminist Theories

Masculinities theory cannot be considered separately from insights
provided through feminist theories. 139 Such an analysis might stop at
understanding the social constructions, or worse, justify abusive behaviors
based on these social constructions. Along with the descriptive
understanding offered by masculinities theory, feminist theories provide
critique and the normative goal of advancing gender equality. Therefore,
masculinities theory should be considered in conjunction with feminist
theories. 140
Feminist analysis of the phenomenon of economic abuse focuses
primarily on understanding the phenomenon as an expression of male
dominance. 141 Specifically, dominance feminism emphasizes the
hierarchy between men and women; the manner by which men dominate
women, highlighting sexual control; and challenging social institutions,
such as the law to examine the way in which they reproduce patriarchy. 142
Dominance feminism advocates that the “personal is the political” and
calls for the politicization of the domestic sphere, and the exposure of
gender subordination in the family before public, judicial, and political
forums. 143

137. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 66. A similar approach was recently
espoused by Leigh Goodmark. See Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15.
138. For the importance of this approach, see Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper,
Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law: Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND
THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 4 (Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper eds.,
2012) [McGinley & Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law].
139. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 66-67 (noting the importance of masculinities
theory to men’s self-understandings and to their assuming responsibilities over their privileges).
140. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 121 (“Masculinities scholarship can be
enormously helpful in further exposing the place of violence in masculinity norms and therefore the
necessity for proactive policies; feminist scholarship can be helpful in pushing masculinities scholars
to analyse how power is replicated and how it might be undermined.”).
141. Branigan, supra note 37, at 7.
142. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
143. CAROL HANISCH, “The Personal is Political,” in RADICAL FEMINISM: A DOCUMENTARY
READER 113, 113 (Barbara Crow ed., 2000).
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Some have dichotomized this feminist position from that of
masculinities theory regarding intimate partner violence. 144 According to
this dichotomy, feminists argue that intimate partner abuse is an assertion
of power and control by the abuser over his partner. This is in line with
the long-standing dominance feminist understanding of what causes
intimate partner abuse 145—the quest for domination and abuse as a means
of asserting power and control. 146 By contrast, those employing
masculinities theory posit that intimate partner abuse may follow a
narrative of diffused, generalized violence, specifically in a hypermasculine context, such as the police or the military. 147 This Article points
to the fact that hegemonic masculinity embeds a notion of controlling
others in and of itself, while also focusing on the larger, structural reasons
for exerting that control in an abusive manner towards wives/intimate
partners and in an economic context.
C.

Masculinities as Performance

Masculinities theory, an interdisciplinary field that draws from
sociology, psychology, feminist theories, and queer theories 148 argues that
masculinity is a performance, something that men “do” rather than
innately “have” or to which they are biologically preordained. 149
Masculinities theory examines the role that males’ gender plays in social
situations 150 and in social institutions. 151 Sociologist R.W. Connell, one of
the field’s pioneers, posited that gender is not an a priori basket of
characteristics, but rather a collection of experiences which are built
through social interaction. 152 Masculine behaviors and identities manifest
and establish power relationships that exist within society, not only
between men and women, but also between men and other men.
144. Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1204-05.
145. Jana L. Jasinski, Theoretical Explanations for Violence Against Women, in SOURCEBOOK
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 12 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001).
146. See, e.g., V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 233 (1996).
147. Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1204-05.
148. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 18–20; Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v.
DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581 (2010) [hereinafter
McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis].
149. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777,
782 (2000) (noting that other identity factors such as race, class, and sexual orientation give rise to
multiple masculinities).
150. See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221 (2015)
[hereinafter McGinley, Policing].
151. McGinley & Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 1.
152. R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 71 (2d ed. 2005).
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Masculinity is “socially constructed through performances. That is, men
construct their masculine identities through relationships with others” 153
oftentimes by acting differently than women. 154 Moreover, masculinity is
performed and activated in relation to social institutions, like the
family. 155
A growing body of legal writing is now exploring how masculinities
theory can shed light on gendered institutions, norms, and practices. 156
Legal scholars, such as Ann McGinley, have argued that masculinities
theory 157 may prove helpful in understanding the motives underlying the
harmful behaviors of men 158 and will eventually lead to increased gender
equality. 159 Nancy Dowd maintains that masculinities theory may prove
helpful in understanding how male privilege and dominance become
established. 160
D.

Hegemonic Masculinity

Masculinities theorists contend that most men “attain” their
masculinity through conforming to the social expectations and codes
153.
154.

McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 586.
JAMES
MESSERSCHMIDT,
MASCULINITIES
AND
CRIME:
CRITIQUE
AND
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY 182 (1993).
155. MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 113 (2d ed. 2004).
156. See, e.g., ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS 17 (2016); NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 181-212
(2000); NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 105-122 (1998); Frank
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity
Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 896 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Against
Bipolar Black Masculinity]; Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo Pornography and the
Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 283 (2006); Fadi Hanna, Punishing
Masculinity in Gay Asylum Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 913 (2005); Joan W. Howarth, Executing White
Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183 (2002); Nancy Levit,
Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1999). Rachel L. Toker, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for SameSex Harassment Law, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577 (1999); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws:
Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68 (2002);
see also Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a New Framework for
Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 433 (2010) (discussing the
emergence of masculinities theory among law and society scholars).
157. The term is in plural to note the variety of male intersectionality and experience. McGinley
& Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 6-7.
158. Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
201, 211-21 (2008); McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 585; Ann C.
McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex.” 79 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1151 (2008).
159. Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703, 706
(2011) .
160. Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra note 131, at 416.
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regarding males and masculinity, and through the performance of
masculinity pursuant to the social constructs. 161 They see a structure,
framework, ideology, or social norm that demands from men that they
behave like “real men.” 162 Despite the fact that the definition of real men
is variable, “hegemonic masculinity” describes the male “ideal” as one
who has the most power at all times and in any given context. 163 Although
there are multiple masculinities, certain aspects of masculinity are so
dominant and honored by society that they are considered
“hegemonic.” 164
Hegemonic masculinity is perceived as the ideal or normative
masculinity. 165 Hegemonic masculinity is about power: the power that
men have and the power that men wield over others. 166 Hegemonic
masculinity’s
defining
characteristics
include
aggression,
competitiveness, and stoicism. 167 Hegemonic masculinity is white,
middle-class, and heterosexual; striving towards hegemonic masculinity
requires that a man continually prove that he is neither feminine nor
gay. 168 Because most men cannot achieve normative or hegemonic
161. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 26; David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation,
Masculinities, and Gender–Variant Individuals, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 167 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012).
162. My use of the terms ideology/norm or ideal/normative in the context of hegemonic
masculinity is not in the sense that those who use the term hegemonic masculinity consider it an ideal,
of course, or normatively desirable, but rather that it is descriptive of the type of masculinity that is
generally most powerful. Some scholars critique this notion even as a description, see, e.g., Jeff Hearn,
From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men, 5 FEMINIST THEORY 49 (2004). But others
endorse an approach that “uses the idea of hegemonic (norm-setting) masculinity to explain why
women and some men are disadvantaged in a given cultural context.” McGinley & Cooper,
Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 5; see also MESSERSCHMIDT, supra
note 154, at 79-81; R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegmonic Masculinity: Rethinking
the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829 (2005); Stephan Whitehead, Hegemonic Masculinity Revisted,
6 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 58 (1999). Hegemonic masculinity, first coined by CONNELL, supra note
152, has since acted as an organizing concept in masculinities theory. See, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, The
Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2010)
(explaining that expanded opportunities for women in the military further entrench hegemonic
masculinity); Mike Donaldson, What Is Hegemonic Masculinity?, 22 THEORY & SOC’Y 643, 645
(1993) (explaining hegemonic masculinity as a strategy for women’s subordination).
163. CONNELL, supra note 152, at 77−78.
164. Id. at 78–81.
165. See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 686–87 (2009) [hereinafter Cooper, Who’s the
Man?].
166. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in SEX, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: THE NEW BASICS, AN
ANTHOLOGY 58, 61 (Abby L. Ferber et al. eds., 2009).
167. David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth of
Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 144 (2009).
168. Cooper, Who’s the Man?, supra note 165, at 689–90; McGinley, A Masculinities Theory
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masculinity, although they continuously strive for it, many men engage in
behaviors intended to prove that they are, in fact, masculine.169
Despite the increased emphasis in masculinities theory being placed
on the relationship between men and other men, for example, between
black and white men or between men of different social classes, 170 it is
important to consider that hegemonic masculinity is internalized, and its
performance is executed in contexts where it may not necessarily be
manifested only vis-à-vis other men. Hegemonic masculinity does not
only exert its influence in all-male interactions, but also on the selfconception that men have of themselves. Therefore, the performance of
masculinity is not a feature exclusive to cases where one is performing in
front of other men. At times, it could be directed towards women in the
privacy of one’s home, and may be used for the purpose of aggrandizing
one’s self-conception of one’s own masculinity.
In most western societies, hegemonic masculinity focuses on
competition, aggression, control, subjugating the other, family patriarchy,
and readiness to commit violence.171 Repudiation, dominance over, and
mistreatment of women are powerful methods of asserting masculinity. 172
For the most part, hegemonic masculinity is focused on being the family’s
provider or breadwinner. 173 Researchers claim that this practice helps men
preserve their power over women. 174 Western society identifies the ability
to be the economic provider of the family as masculine, and often money
constitutes a “yardstick” for one’s masculinity. 175 Scholars note that the
ability to earn money, to control it, and to use it to provide for the family
proves to many men their own masculinity and accordingly, strengthens
their sense of self-worth. 176

Analysis, supra note 148, at 586.
169. McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 586.
170. Id.
171. JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, NINE LIVES: ADOLESCENT MASCULINITIES, THE BODY, AND
VIOLENCE 10 (2000); MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY
30 (2005).
172. Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 156, at 896.
173. Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 43. See also RICHARD COLLIER, MASCULINITY, LAW AND
THE FAMILY 195 (1995), and infra notes 186-208.
174. Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 364 (2004).
175. AMALIA ROSENBLUM & ZVI TRIGER, SPEECHLESS 90−92 (2007); Ann C. McGinley,
Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 802 (2013) [hereinafter McGinley,
Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power].
176. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine
Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2013); McGinley, A
Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 614; McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual
Power, supra note 175.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3

350

E.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:323

The Relationship Between Hegemonic Masculinity, Violence, and
Coercive Control

Scholars note that violence as an element of masculinity is
profoundly tied to the assertion of social stature and ingrained in the
edifice of the masculine self. 177 Others have noticed that given the
association of violence and criminality with hegemonic masculinity, men
may deploy violence and crime to separate themselves from women,
thereby constituting their masculinity. 178 Men are not essentially violent,
of course, and “[c]rime by men is not simply an extension of the ‘male
sex role.’ Rather, crime by men is a form of social practice invoked as a
resource, when other resources are unavailable, for accomplishing
masculinity.” 179 Acting violently is therefore “one socially recognized
way of being a man.” 180
Various researchers contend that crime and violence are ways of
performing hegemonic masculinity. 181 Humiliation, shaming, and
competition between men are also important components in establishing
hegemonic masculinity. The subjugation of women is an additional way
of establishing male identity. 182 Thus, performance of hegemonic
masculinity sometimes includes the harassment, contempt, shaming, and
subjugation of the other. 183 Scholars claim that some men are occupied in
the performance of their masculinity by aggression in order to
differentiate themselves from their wives and thereby strengthen their
sense of masculinity. 184 As Naomi Cahn observed, power within the
household remains an assertion of identity. 185
F.

The Relationship between Hegemonic Masculinity, Breadwinning,
and the Home

Men are commonly socialized into male roles as traditional heads of
households or breadwinners. 186 Scholars agree that breadwinning shapes

177. Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 6.
178. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 84–85.
179. Id. at 85.
180. Harris, supra note 149, at 782.
181. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 83-85.
182. McGinley, Policing, supra note 150, at 245 (“[M]ale police officers denigrate female
officers as well as women in the community as a means of enhancing their own masculinity.”);
Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15.
183. McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 601−03.
184. McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, supra note 175, at 801−02.
185. Cahn, supra note 53, at 202.
186. Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 118.
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most men’s sense of self, gender, and manhood, 187 and note that a
“providership requirement represents hegemonic masculinity in its purest
form.” 188 A key element of hegemonic masculinity is wage earning. 189
While men’s roles cannot be essentialized, and there are important
variations within different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic
communities, 190 with regard to how men understand and perform
masculinity, hegemonic masculinity posits male breadwinning as an
enduring staple of manhood. To perform hegemonic masculinity, men
must establish their status as breadwinners, whether through proving their
physical strength in blue collar jobs, or their heroic stamina by working
long hours in professional settings. 191 McGinley notes that today work is
a site in which men earn their identities; work is competitive, and through
work, men prove their masculinity by aggregating power: be it by
accumulating wealth for professionals, making good salaries by middleclass men, or performing tough physical labor by men of the workingclass. 192
Whereas money had been coded in patriarchal culture as
“masculine,” 193 some claim that patriarchy created a dangerous liaison
between women and money. 194 According to this claim, femininity is
characterized by patriarchal culture as passive and dependent, and women
are characterized as lacking knowledge and skills in every aspect
pertaining to money and finances. 195 Culture is saturated, according to this
view, with images that express women’s apparent lack of skill in
everything finance-related, but shows their desire for money and their
lightheadedness when using it. 196
Under masculinities theory, one of the strongest commands which
hegemonic masculinity makes is that one may not, at any price, act as a

187. ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (1993).
188. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 279; Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind:
How the Family and Medical Leave Act Perpetuates Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 442−43 (2007).
189. Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, Dirty Harry Meets Dirty Diapers: Masculinities, At-home
Fathers, and Making the Law Work for Families, 22 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 21 (2012).
190. Id. at 21−23 (noting that even stay-at-home dads aim to preserve their masculinity by
maintaining breadwinner status through engaging in limited, paid work allowing them to meet the
breadwinning requirement “at least in spirit”).
191. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 86 (2010); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 274−75.
192. See MCGINLEY, supra note 156, at 6-7, 15-16.
193. Zvi Triger, Money, Contracts and Gender, 18 L. & BUS. 135, 136 (2014).
194. Id. at 142, 150.
195. Id. at 139−40.
196. Id.
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woman. 197 It is not surprising, therefore, that as women establish their
socio-economic status in the market, this may create a fear among men as
to their own manhood. 198 When women obtain jobs and positions
historically held by men, this may threaten some men’s sense of masculine
identity, and some may react to this threat by engaging in harassing
behaviors in the workplace. 199 Thus, one may, similarly, interpret
incidents of economic abuse, in which men restrict their wives’
employment as fear of “losing” their own masculinity.
Men face significant pressures in the workplace to abide by the
breadwinning code, 200 and scholars have recognized the fact that the
working norms in the most sought-after industries are “masculine.” 201
This is not to suggest that all men have power in the market, but rather
that the market has traditionally been gendered male. Hegemonic
masculinity is intrinsically tied with men’s roles as providers so much so
that scholars note that “no social construct bears more power over men
than the expectation that they serve as the family breadwinner,” 202 as the
person who “brings home the bacon.” As a result, women’s increased
economic roles as providers are “shaking men’s identities to their
foundations.” 203 Furthermore, in today’s volatile economy of long work
hours and weak social safety nets, 204 fewer American men are able to
satisfy the providership expectation. 205
By contrast, caregiving is usually not “masculine.” 206 Most men are
still reluctant to fully take on care-work, which remains a highly
feminized form of work. 207 Household labor symbolizes women’s gender

197. Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 29.
198. Triger, supra note at 193, at 149−50; Richard H. Thaler, Breadwinning Wives and Nervous
Husbands, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/business/breadwinnerwives-and-nervous-husbands.html [http://perma.cc/2R8E-9B2F].
199. See MCGINLEY, supra note 156, at 17 & Introduction (explaining that men are pressured
to serve as breadwinners and harassing/violent behavior is a way to claim masculinity).
200. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 258.
201. Richard Collier, Rethinking Men and Masculinities in the Contemporary Legal Profession:
The Example of Fatherhood, Transnational Business Masculinities, and Work Life Balance in Large
Law Firms, 13 NEV. L.J. 410, 414 (2013).
202. KATHLEEN GERSON, NO MAN’S LAND: MEN’S CHANGING COMMITMENTS TO FAMILY AND
WORK 259 (1993) (“If men no longer share a distinctive identity based on their economic role as
family providers, then what is a man?”).
203. MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY 288 (3d ed. 2012).
204. See Crain, supra note 74, at 1918–19 (arguing that post-industrialism has made the family
wage unattainable for most families); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 280.
205. See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 523–24 (1996)
(discussing men’s work patterns).
206. NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 31−33 (2000).
207. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 254.
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role conformance, while breadwinning symbolizes men’s gender
conformance. Men are often reluctant to engage in the feminine
occupation of family-work, fearing their status as real men will
diminish. 208
G.

Economic Abuse as a Misguided Interpretation of Hegemonic
Masculinity

Masculinities theory claims that there is constant pressure on men as
individuals to aspire toward the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. 209
Despite the fact that men try to conform to the social ideal of hegemonic
masculinity, it is an ideal that many feel is unobtainable. 210 In an era where
workers must work longer hours with fewer safety nets, the race to attain
hegemonic masculinity is very difficult indeed.
As a result, some men are likely to develop interpretations or
objections to hegemonic masculinity. 211 At times it is precisely the
performance of the interpretation of hegemonic masculinity which is
especially belligerent. 212 A significant insight from masculinities theory
is that men, as a group, enjoy the “patriarchal dividends” from the power
and resources of being men; however, because of the pressures exerted on
men to act pursuant to masculine norms, as individuals, they often feel
powerless. 213 It is precisely this feeling of powerlessness which creates
the need to control others. 214 This may be more pronounced in times of
economic hardship. The imperative to differentiate from women promotes
some men’s greater assertion of control over the family economy.
Against this backdrop it is possible to think of economic abuse as an
interpretation of hegemonic masculinity. As noted, according to
masculinities theorists, violence is a type of resource that men exercise
when they do not possess other resources in order to perform
masculinity. 215 Wielding economic abuse is therefore a way for certain
men to perform masculinity and hold on to their power over their family
208. Cahn, supra note 53, at 200–01.
209. CONNELL, supra note 152, at 121–24; Kimmel, supra note 166, at 61-62.
210. BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOLS 106 (1993); Dowd, Asking
the Man Question, supra note 131, at 421. (“[M]asculinity requires constant proof of one’s manhood:
it is a status never achieved but one constantly to be established and tested.”).
211. THORNE, supra note 210, at 106.
212. See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 11–12; McGinley, A Masculinities Theory
Analysis, supra note 148.
213. CONNELL, supra note 152, at 79, 229–30; DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at
30–31; Kimmel, supra note 166, at 68.
214. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 31.
215. Id. at 33; MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 85.
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through economic resources. Economic abuse over one’s wife and
coercive control with respect to the family’s resources may thus represent
a performance of hegemonic masculinity.
Nonetheless, masculinities theory also shows that men pay a price
for their superfluous rights in society. 216 Men pay a price in their parenting
and a price for their very control. Controlling the family economy, while
granting power, also imposes burdens (for men in the lower social-strata
to obtain money, and for men in higher echelons to preserve and cultivate
capital). Additionally, the very control of the other induces tension, guilt,
and fear. Importantly, researchers emphasize that despite the fact that men
are molded by social constructs, they are also, as a category and as
individuals and at certain time periods, agents of social practices. 217
Potentially, at least, they are likely also to deviate from the script dictated
by hegemonic masculinity.
Masculinities theory explains the centrality of economic control,
breadwinning, coercive control, and even violence to the construction of
hegemonic masculinity and, therefore, can shed light on the myriad social
factors that enable economic abuse. Insights from masculinities theory on
the ways by which male identity is established, on the importance of
economic control as part of hegemonic masculinity, and on the use of
violence as a resource for establishing masculinity may explain the
existence of economic abuse as a socio-legal phenomenon. 218 Masculinity
theory points to the ways by which men attain and preserve power, but
also the prices they pay for their control. While economic control may be
an element of hegemonic masculinity that may be used coercively and that
may be difficult for some men to relinquish on their own, it is also socially
constructed and historically contingent. It is therefore changeable. There
is nothing natural or inevitable about this notion of masculinity as
aggressive, controlling, and economically domineering. Today
hegemonic masculinity, backed by social, historical, legal, and economic
gender inequities provides a foundation for economic abuse to occur.
Clearly a change of hegemonic masculinity, which is now based on
providership, control, and violence requires a separation from privileges
from which men derive benefit 219 and an untangling of the relationship
between masculinity, control, and money.

216.
217.
218.
219.

DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 59.
Hearn, supra note 162.
See McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, supra note 175, at 800.
Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 30.
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V. BETWEEN REMEDIES AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
Economic abuse is a complex problem, with myriad manifestations,
and no easy solutions. This Part presents and provides justification for
some remedies, while critiquing others, based on the insights provided
earlier. More broadly, it contemplates some fundamental changes that are
required to mitigate economic abuse.
Currently, the legal system’s general tendency to focus on physical
harm presents significant challenges to women who are economically
abused. 220 Economic abuse is rarely recognized as domestic violence by
state criminal and civil laws because of the focus on physical assaults,221
and seldom falls neatly into the enumerated categories of abuse that
provide legal protection. 222 A recent report conducted at Cornell
University found a dearth of effective systems in place to remedy the
impacts of economic abuse. 223 A critique of domestic violence policies
has been that they focus on physical and sexual violence as paradigmatic
of intimate partner abuse, while neglecting other harms such as economic
abuse. 224 The policies’ goal is immediate crisis control rather than
promotion of long term security. 225 The policies favor separation, often
neglecting the desires of the abused partner and the web of relationships
that de facto keep partners in contact. 226
Scholars note the centrality of the criminal justice system is focused
on physical harms in U.S. domestic violence law and policy. 227 At present,
220. Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Pollet, supra note 11, at 41.
221. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38-42; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1112.
222. Conner, supra note 8, at 362.
223. Stringer, supra note 22.
224. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1112.
225. Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 157.
226. Id.
227. Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1195. This centrality must also be
understood against the background of the state’s initial absence of a response to domestic violence
and the feminist focus on reacting to this void. The many services developed, such as protective
orders, emergency shelters, and counselling were accomplished due to these efforts. See Johnson,
Changing Course, supra note 8, at 155–57. Goodmark explains the historical developments: In 1984,
the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence framed domestic violence as a criminal justice
issue and strongly recommended expanding the criminal justice response to domestic violence.
Although the first developments in domestic violence law were civil, in the form of protection orders,
changes to the criminal law soon followed, with states passing laws creating substantive crimes of
domestic violence. Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 102. See JEFFREY FAGAN, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 4–5, 8–9 (1996); Leigh
Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 75, 92–96 (2008); Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 140–45; Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857–60 (1996); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle
for the Future of Domestic Violence Law Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1668–75 (2004); Deborah
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every state has criminal laws that enable it to intervene on behalf of
women, primarily in the case of physical abuse. 228 The criminal justice
system is an important means of addressing intimate partner abuse. 229
Specifically, some have suggested criminalizing domestic oppression,
dynamics, and patterns of coercive control, which would encompass
economic abuse. 230
In recent years, however, scholars have critiqued both the fit and the
desirability of the criminal justice response to ameliorate intimate partner
abuse. Some have challenged its effectiveness, 231 while others have
challenged its disproportionate impact on the poor and on people of
color. 232 Others have claimed that the focus on criminality ignores the
larger structural issues that drive intimate partner abuse, such as economic
insecurity. 233 While some scholars note that the criminal system merely
substitutes the abusers’ authority over the abused with that of the
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic
Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 970–71 (2004). Following the cancellation of the civil
rights remedy in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994, Violence Against Women Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981)
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-62), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
VAWA funds most of the programs concerning domestic violence, with the largest federal
appropriations granted to the criminal justice system. See Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8,
at 161. For more on the VAWA, see Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 417, 418–21 (2003); Julie Goldscheid, Elusive
Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 736 (2007); Julie
Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not
Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165–71 (2005); Rashida Manjoo, The Continuum of Violence against
Women and the Challenges of Effective Redress, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012). For the
influence of the Act, see Weissman, supra note 17, at 227.
228. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 1.
229. Id. at 22; Leigh Goodmark, Stalled at 20: VAWA, the Criminal Justice System, and the
Possibilities of Restorative Justice (U. Md. Francis King Carey Sch. Law, Research Paper No. 20153, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2575646 [http://perma.cc/39FPEG24].
230. Steve Mulligan, Redefining Domestic Violence: Using the Power and Control Paradigm
for Domestic Violence Legislation, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 33, 39 (2009); Alafair S. Burke,
Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 552, 556 (2007) (arguing for criminalization when the abuser is engaged in a pattern
of domestic violence with the intent to gain power or control over the victim); Tuerkheimer, supra
note 227, at 970–71. Internationally, some jurisdictions have chosen to address economic abuse as a
criminal offense. See, e.g., Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in India: Economic
Abuse and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretation to Promote Women’s Fundamental Rights, 13
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 179 (2006); Mary Johnson Osirim, Crisis in the State and the Family:
Violence Against Women in Zimbabwe, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 153 (2003).
231. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 199.
232. BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON
NATION 3, 99-124 (2012); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000).
233. Weissman, supra note 17, at 238.
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state’s, 234 robbing women of their autonomy and ignoring their needs. 235
Importantly, some have noted that criminalization reinforces masculinity
as aggressive. 236 Others have suggested using tort law to sue partners for
monetary damages in cases of economic abuse. 237 Although that may
enhance women’s agency and grant them economic redress, such suits
would only be effective insofar as the abusive partner has assets or
finances from which to collect. 238
Today, civil protection orders (CPOs) are the most common and
widely used relief for domestic violence. 239 CPOs are generally
considered as empowering for abused partners who seek judicial
protection, while simultaneously providing a legal mechanism to enforce
their decision to act. 240 Scholars have critiqued the limited recognition of
selected harms for which CPOs are used and have suggested the need to
incorporate a broader approach that will encompass economic abuse. 241
While every state has enacted CPO statutes, the states offer different
definitions of what constitutes domestic violence (all refer to an actual or
threatened criminal offense against an intimate partner or family
member), 242 and most do not incorporate a definition that includes

234. SUK, supra note 63, at 7, 53-54; id. at 54 (“[There is] an opportunity for critical reflection
on the increasing subordination of individual autonomy in domestic space to state control of the home
in the name of the public interest.”).
235. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). Goodmark also observed
that money funneled into the criminal justice system is not spent on housing, job training, or economic
development. See GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 22.
236. Jamie R. Abrams, Migrating and Mutating Masculinities in Institutional Law Reform, in
EXPLORING MASCULINITIES: FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY REFLECTIONS 145, 146–47, 153 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Michael Thomson eds., 2013) [hereinafter Abrams, Migrating and Mutating
Masculinities].
237. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1158.
238. Littwin, supra note 3, at 957.
239. Stoever, supra note 117, at 1021. For the historical evolution of CPOs, see id. at 1035–44.
240. Adeola Olagunji & Christine Reynolds, Domestic Violence, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 203,
207 (2012). But see Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489
(2008) (explaining that domestic violence law does not sufficiently meet the needs of women who
want the relationship to continue but the violence to stop, but by customizing each order to express
the victim’s preferences for how much and what kinds of contact should be allowed, these orders can
put the force of law behind the individual woman’s choices); Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note
5, at 1128; Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency,
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that agency means not living with oppression, but that the “all-agent or
all-victim conceptual dichotomy will not be easy to escape or transform”).
241. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1115 (listing the jurisdictions that can
potentially address coercion or economic abuse). See also Conner, supra note 8.
242. Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality
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economic abuse. 243 While several states recognize certain elements of
coercive control as abuse, 244 few have directly addressed economic

of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35 (2008); Kristy Candela, Protecting the Invisible Victim:
Incorporating Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112 (2016);
Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 159; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131–
32.
243. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1130–38.
244. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:l (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (includes “interference
with freedom” under definition of abuse); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.) (definition of abuse includes “engaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in
a manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress”), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(13)
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Michigan defines abuse as “any other specific act or conduct that
imposes on or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence”);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Maine defines abuse as
“[c]ompelling a person by force, threat of force or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the
person has a right or privilege to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to engage”).
But “not one state has encompassed the entirety of coercive control as abuse in their domestic violence
statute.” Candela, supra note 242, at 113. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.);
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6300-6301 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-15 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); D.C. CODE § 16-1003 (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (Westlaw through Act 3 of 2017 Sess.); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 39-6304 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 60/103 (Westlaw through
Public Acts eff. Nov. 22, 2017); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); IOWA CODE
§ 236.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I 9-A, § 4002 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MD.
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-504 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1
(Westlaw through Ch. 74 of 2017 Sess.); MICH. COMP LAWS § 600.2950 (Westlaw through 2017
Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (amended by 2017 Nev. Laws
Ch. 496 (S.B. 361)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B.1 (Westlaw through Ch. 258 of 2017 Sess.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-13-3 (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.); N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-1 (Westlaw through 2017-142 with the exception of 2017-6, §§ 1-4(c)); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07.1-02 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Westlaw through 2017
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.) (excluding Ch. 750); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6102 (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2510-3 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.004 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-501 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 813.12
(Westlaw through 2017 Act 58); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.).
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abuse. 245 Furthermore, different states offer different remedies: some
jurisdictions may prohibit contact (stay-away orders), abuse, and
harassment; other jurisdictions may require an abusive partner to vacate a
shared residence; some jurisdictions may order counseling for domestic
violence, substance abuse, or parenting skills, award use of jointly-owned
possessions, or order child support, housing payments, and medical
expenses resulting from the abuse. 246 While two-thirds of the states
provide catch-all provision that could deliver economic orders beyond
child support and could include damages, 247 state courts rarely order
economic relief, 248 despite the importance of issuing significant economic
remedies as part of CPOs. 249
Littwin suggests a mechanism to repair credit scores as a way to
redress the ramifications of credit ruined by coerced debt—the blocking
of credit debt from credit reporting agencies and vesting family courts
with the decision of the parties’ responsibilities to the debt.250 Others have
suggested creating incentives for financial institutions to be mindful of
coerced debt and better monitor and report it. 251 Parenting education is
commonly used by courts, and in some states it is even mandated. 252

245. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Colorado’s
statute describes abuse as “financial control, document control, and other types of control that make
a victim more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(1)(g), (4) (Westlaw through 2017 Sess. No. 150) (Michigan’s statute
permits a court to issue an order if a partner is interfering with employment or education).
246. Stoever, supra note 117, at 1043. Importantly, many apply to unmarried and same-sex
partners. Id.
247. Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 159. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §16-1005(c)
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.).
248. Weissman, supra note 17, at 228; Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 3, 43 (1999).
249. Erika A. Sussman, The Civil Protection Orders as a Tool for Economic Justice, J.W. MAG.
(2006), https://csaj.org/document-library/POasEconJustice2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/28BJ-N7LE].
250. Littwin acknowledges that her proposal applies only to women who are divorcing their
abusers, and that it cannot assist those who wish to stay or are unmarried. Littwin, Escaping Battered
Credit, supra note 8, at 365-66, 390–408.
251. Christine Kim, Credit Cards: Weapons for Domestic Violence, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 281, 307 (2015).
252. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-351 to 25-353 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-322 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.7 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-69b (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1507(h) (Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017 Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/404.1 (Westlaw through Public Acts eff. Nov. 22,
2017); IOWA CODE § 598.15 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3214 (Westlaw
through 2017 Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:306 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 7-103.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.157 (Westlaw through 2017
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.600 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-226
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Similarly, financial literacy education has been offered as possible
redress. 253 Yet such financial education should stress the importance of
consensual and equitable management of resources, and should also be
critical of financial institutions’ goals and means, to be instrumental in
preventing or mitigating cases of economic abuse.254 Such financial
education, if properly provided to women, could potentially assist in
untangling the Gordian knot between hegemonic masculinity and money
control. Yet, some of these measures are only applicable to women who
would want to separate from the abusive partner, which is not always the
case. 255
Some have suggested amending CPO laws to include economic
abuse, to allow an economically abused woman to restructure how she
interacts with her partner and how to maintain property, 256 hoping such
orders will change power dynamics that are at the core of abuse. Yet their
short term duration does not correspond to persistent long term dangers, 257
and specifically to the long term effects of economic abuse. By
themselves, CPOs are emergency measures, isolated from the broader
social picture that enables economic abuse. The following is a telling
example of the law’s limited effect, even when CPOs are constructed to
redress economic abuse. In a recent New Jersey case, an estranged spouse
was purposefully interfering with his former spouses’ employment. 258 The
court recognized this behavior as economic abuse and a form of coercion
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2928 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:458-D (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.3, 12.5
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OR. REV.
STAT. § 3.425 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (excluding Ch. 750); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-408
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.009 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.3 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-104 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WIS.
STAT. § 767.401 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 58); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(f) (Westlaw through
2017 Sess.). Programs authorizing judges to “order” divorcing parents to participate in parental
education classes are already mandated by court rules in at least Alaska, California, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming. See Tali
Schaefer, Saving Children or Blaming Parents? Lessons from Mandated Parenting Classes, 19
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 491, 495 (2010); Susan L. Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide
Survey of Mandatory Parent Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 375 (2008).
253. Kim, supra note 251.
254. Because under extreme coercion or violence, consent may not be genuine, these programs
should likewise stress an equitable component of money managing.
255. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
256. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1129.
257. Stoever, supra note 117, at 1021.
258. C.G. v. E.G., No. FV-1921-16, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1638 (Ch. Div. June 30,
2016).
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under the newly amended New Jersey domestic violence law. 259 The court
granted a restraining order to protect the woman’s rights to “be left
alone.” 260 While the restraining order was helpful in the immediate
situation, that alone does not undermine the phenomenon of economic
abuse or the imbalance of power within the family that breeds coercive
control, more generally.
Scholars have critiqued the short term nature of domestic violence
policy and have proposed to shift law, policy, and funding towards long
term goals of supporting women’s economic security. 261 These scholars
suggest enhancing economic security through myriad measures, such as
housing, career counseling, long term physical and mental health care,
economic remedies, secure employment, and enhancing social capital,
reliable public benefits, associations, and networks of support. 262 These
changes could be helpful in certain contexts, if provided in a nondemeaning, empowering, and sufficient way. Financial resilience could
recalibrate power within an intimate relationship 263 because studies
suggest that, except for women in high income brackets, increasing
women’s income (and men’s incomes) tends to reduce domestic
violence. 264 Law and society bears responsibility for ameliorating
economic abuse because they have enforced a long history of engendered
power in the family, and have been complacent in structuring the
background for the perpetration of economic abuse, through the
enablement of “ideal worker” norms in the market and a “laissez-faire”
attitude towards managing money in the marriage. State responsibility is

259. In August, 2015, the New Jersey Legislature formally amended the Domestic Violence Act
to include certain additional definitions of domestic violence, including coercion under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(15) (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.), as defined by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.).
260. C.G., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1638.
261. Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 153. See also GOODMARK, supra note 6, at
157.
262. Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 153. See also GOODMARK, supra note 6, at
157.
263. Conner, supra note 8, at 374; see also Coker, supra note 232, at 1022–23.
264. Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 180–81; Kameri Christy-McMullin, Designing
Policies that Address the Relationship Between Woman Abuse and Economic Resources, 29 J. SOC.
& SOC. WELFARE 109, 113 (2002); Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, An Economic Analysis of
Domestic Violence, 55 REV. SOC. ECON. 337 (1997). Margo Lindauer, “Please Stop Telling Her to
Leave”: Where Is The Money: Reclaiming Economic Power to Address Domestic Violence, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1263 (2016) (“[E]conomic dependence is a critical factor in violence
prevention.”). But see Kameri Christy-McMullin, An Evidenced-Based Approach to a Theoretical
Understanding of the Relationship Between Economic Resources, Race/Ethnicity, and Woman Abuse,
3 J. EVIDENCE-BASED SOC. WORK 1, 23 (2006) (showing studies examining the relationship between
economic resources and abuse provided mixed results).
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thus justified because law and society have designed the gender
constructions that enable the power dynamics that lead to economic abuse.
Furthermore, because of law and society’s place in the construction
of intimate power, we need to contemplate modes of relief that go beyond
the immediate, individual abused woman, the abusive partner, and even
beyond her economic security, and generate larger structural changes in
intimate power distribution that will destabilize and transcend current
notions of hegemonic masculinity. We need to think about the social and
legal structures relating to the market and the family that are in place and
which now provide a fertile ground for economic abuse to take place and
which affect everyone: men, women, children, those currently facing
economic abuse, and those who may experience it at some point. I suggest
that we should contemplate remedies that carry out the following goals:
(1) destabilize hegemonic masculinity and (2) promote women’s
“agency” 265—which has been proved crucial in overcoming violence 266—
by increasing resilience through increasing women’s economic assets and
social relationships. 267
The historical lens combined with insights from masculinities theory
tell us how structural power dynamics continue to shape families’ lives,
even in the age of formal equality. When we think of the ties between
economic abuse and hegemonic masculinity, socialization towards
violence, the historical socialization of men as heads of households, and
the impact of economic volatility, it becomes clear that a systemic,
structural paradigm must enrich the individualistic mode of thought that
currently inhibits domestic violence redress. Seen this way, economic
abuse is performed by individuals onto individuals, but it is inflicted
265. I extend to this context Kathryn Abrams’ conceptualization of agency as self-direction
rather than autonomy and as embedded in systemic inequality. Under this understanding, agency can
be cultivated through material, structural, political, and cultural supports. See Abrams, From
Autonomy to Agency, supra note 101, at 831-32, 834, 841, 845 (1999) (“[A]s women’s selfdirection . . . has come to be understood as a multiple socially-influenced phenomenon that takes
place in a context of shifting and unequal power relations, some theorists have begun to argue that
legal regulation in this area may help to foster agency . . . human beings are formed in their
preferences, abilities, and capacities to respond to coercion, by material circumstances, and
relationships or affiliations with others.”).
266. See Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 112-14 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004); Goldfarb, supra note 240, at 1501–02, 1523; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1114.
267. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 15 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]. While
Fineman’s theory objects to identity-based categories as a basis of vulnerability, and this Article has
used masculinities theory to observe how power is distributed in the family, it has embedded its
identity analysis in social structures and therefore, I believe, is able to rely on her conceptualization
of “resilience” as meant to provide resources for countering vulnerabilities, such as violence.
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against a backdrop of historical, social, and economic structures that the
state through law has put in place. Therefore, it would be a mistake to
think about economic abuse only in an individualized manner, but rather,
we ought to think about economic abuse in a way that is related to the
structures of the family and the market. Ameliorating economic abuse
may require no less than undoing hegemonic masculinity. A temporary
CPO may provide concrete relief for an abused woman if it applies to
economic abuse; if it provides resources for economic and emotional
healing; if it is provided for a long enough period of time; and if there are
good jobs with decent wages in place, as well as transportation options
and proper child-care (many, many “ifs”). However, it will not put an end
to the cycle of violence on a societal level. Undoing hegemonic
masculinity will not be achieved through a temporary stay away order nor
a mandatory arrest. Although these may be helpful in the case of a
concrete and immediate emergency, mandatory arrests and using the
criminal system may also exacerbate the problem by reinforcing the
connections between masculinity and crime, especially for people of color
and the poor. 268 Destabilizing hegemonic masculinity therefore requires a
deeper reaching approach. It requires creating positive non-violent role
models and means for men to achieve status that are not only economic
and not primarily economic. 269 At a societal level, it may require
advancing new, alternative notions of manhood. It requires relinquishing
economic dominance as a staple of manhood, on the one hand, and an
expansion of men’s other productive roles in the family, on the other.
Concurrently, we should think of fostering women’s agency by using
law to combat women’s oppression, 270 and substantially equalizing
opportunities for women. Women’s increased market participation may
decrease their economic dependence 271 if such participation also accounts
for the caregiving responsibilities women often have, and if such
participation provides reasonable resources, decent work, and benefits.
Supporting hierarchy-attenuating policies such as government sponsored
268. Abrams, Migrating and Mutating Masculinities, supra note 236.
269. This may require education and training. There are organizations worldwide that aim to
challenge the norms of hegemonic masculinity and encourage men to take larger caretaking roles in
their families, see, e.g., About, PROMUNDO GLOBAL, http://promundoglobal.org/about/
[http://perma.cc/3T5B-G9C3]. For a similar approach regarding transition to peace in conflicted
societies, see Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 20.
270. Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency, supra note 101.
271. Jennifer Swanberg et al., Working Women Making It Work: Intimate Partner Violence,
Employment, and Workplace Support, 22 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 292 (2007); Ross Macmillan &
Rosemary Gartner, When She Brings Home the Bacon: Labor-Force Participation and the Risk of
Spousal Violence Against Women, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 947 (1999); Jamie Haar, Women’s Work:
Economic Security in the Domestic Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 471 (2014).
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child-care and the de-marginalization of care work (often associated with
women) is needed to provide for a society in which both men and women
work, care, and share power; and where families are well-supported. 272
Domestic violence is characterized by a power imbalance between
the parties. 273 Household power differentials replicate market hierarchies,
and family well-being must be considered within the realm of the market
and the political economy. 274 We may need to reconsider law’s “laissezfaire” attitude towards managing money during marriage, especially given
the connections between hegemonic masculinity and economic control,
and since the family is our first and possibly most important school of
justice. 275 We may need to strengthen demands to overhaul work norms
that discriminate against caregivers and perpetuate their economic
inequality, 276 and insist on norms that allow for familial caregiving
alongside good work. 277
Power imbalances are deeply ingrained in society. Changes in social
policy regarding child-care, changes in work norms, and a reevaluation of
the law’s attitude towards money management during marriage may
change some of the power imbalance, destabilize hegemonic masculinity,
and provide more resources for women to recalibrate familial power
dynamics. Addressing violent masculinity through meaningful economic
opportunities, 278 while also opening up new avenues for performing
masculinity not solely focused on breadwinning, may positively affect not
272. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 209. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 9 (2010) (arguing for state
responsibility to support caretaking); Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 267; Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010).
273. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 123.
274. EICHNER, supra note 272, at 55–57; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 88-89 (2004) (market affects familial well-being); June Carbone,
Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family, Gender and the Reconstruction of Class Barriers, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 527, 530 (2011).
275. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 21 (1983). Czapanskiy, supra
note 77, at 1461 (“Fomenting change is an old and a legitimate role for law in the realm of family
conduct as well as in the realm of other gendered relationships.”); id. at 1481 (“The potential of the
law to express a social norm as well as to make a difference in people’s conduct is substantial.”);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1926
(2000) (“[L]egal rules can clarify and announce the specific behavioral expectations embodied in
social norms.”); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to Understand Social Norms as
Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455 (2003) (arguing that the law can be used to change norms for
circumcision).
276. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 91, at 2.
277. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1233 (1989). See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring
the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 474 (1990).
278. Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 21.
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only women who suffer economic abuse, but may also benefit men,
women, and families at large. To recalibrate the power dynamic at the
heart of economic abuse, 279 economic and social insecurities must be
addressed. 280 Hierarchy-attenuating policies can destabilize hegemonic
masculinity, unraveling the Gordian knot between hegemonic
masculinity, control, and money. A responsive state would need to
support men, women, and families in times of such transition.
VI. EPILOGUE
Family law’s canon “reports that family law prioritizes sex equality
and . . . has freed itself from its historical entanglements in subordination
and injustice,” but scholars have long noted that family law’s roots
continue to influence family relations. 281 Courts have often and recently
cited the end of coverture as the transformation of marriage from a maledominated institution to an institution that recognizes men and women as
equals. 282 Yet beyond formal legal recognition of men and women as
equals lies a social, economic, and gendered reality. 283 Recent marriage
equality discourse in Obergefell v. Hodges 284 focused primarily on the
freedom to marry, but did not concern freedom within marriage. 285 While
Obergefell understandably celebrated the demise of coverture, courts will
need to grapple with its “modern vestiges” 286 going forward. Yet, the
history of transformational change invoked in Obergefell offers some
hope for transformation in intimate relation jurisprudence. 287
This Article illustrated the existence of economic abuse between
spouses and has shown that the legal system has yet to deal with it in a
comprehensive and significant manner. This neglect is not genderneutral. 288 A feminist approach to law must shed light on those places
where the law has not been adjusted to cater to the life circumstances
279. Baker, supra note 242, at 57.
280. Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 7.
281. HASDAY, supra note 51, at 5.
282. Id. at 101–02. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 70 –71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (No. 14-556).
283. See Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, supra note 110.
284. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 282.
285. See Colker, supra note 16, at 386–87. See also Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s
Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919 (2016) (explaining that Obergefell rests largely on
liberty rather than equality).
286. Id. at 411.
287. Mayeri, supra note 66, at 127. Mayeri was referring to a different transformation while
critiquing the Court’s affirmation of marriage supremacy.
288. CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS 221 (1984).
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predominantly experienced by women, 289 and therefore the
conceptualization of economic abuse into the legal discourse is a feminist
process. Nonetheless, this Article has used masculinities theory in order
to analyze the phenomenon; to understand hegemonic masculinity’s
relationship to the activation of economic abuse; and to understand how
historical, social, and legal norms constitute a fertile ground for economic
abuse (without derogating obviously from the personal responsibility of
the men wielding it).
The law has a long history of establishing men as the breadwinners
and women as the financial dependents on the males in their families.290
Even today, hegemonic masculinity rests significantly on the ability to
provide for a family; and the ability to provide for a family, in turn,
informs economic control of the family. 291 Even in this postmodern era
which is thriving with new forms of families, such as same-sex couples,
single-parent families, or blended families, important aspects of the
traditional family have remained firmly intact for heterosexual couples,
especially male domination of economic aspects of the family. 292 Power
remains unequal even in this new, more egalitarian age. It is, nonetheless,
a product of history, law, and society, and it is therefore transformable.

289. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 96–105 (1989);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 142, at 54–56.
290. Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, supra note 110, at 575.
291. FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 151; ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS
EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 276–77 (1976); STACEY, supra note 75, at 8.
292. HASDAY, supra note 51, at 97–132.
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